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Abstract: The EC Directive on financial instruments markets 2004 (MiFID) 
has introduced a number of order and trade publication obligations imposed on 
organised exchanges, alternative trading systems (ATS), and the class of broker 
dealers that execute transactions in shares internally. This article investigates 
the impact of MiFID’s trade transparency rules on the trading volume of EU 
equity markets in a forward-looking mode. We use data extracted from the 
closest possible precedent and examine trading volume levels before and after 
trading in FTSE100 stocks on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) shifted from 
the quote-driven Stock Exchange Automatic Quotation System (SEAQ) to the 
order-driven securities electronic trading service (SETS). This change resulted 
in significantly increased transparency standards. Trading volume is measured 
on the basis of three criteria: volume-based turnover, value-based turnover and 
turnover ratio. No evidence is found indicating that higher transparency 
standards lead per se to higher levels of trading volume. Therefore, the impact 
of MiFID’s transparency rules on trading volume in EU equity markets should 
become a matter of further study following their implementation. 
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1 Introduction 
The EC Directive on financial instruments markets (MiFID)1 has introduced a number of 
order and trade publication requirements imposed on organised exchanges, called in the 
directive regulated markets, qualifying alternative trading systems (ATSs), called in the 
directive multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), and broker dealers that execute internally 
transactions in shares admitted to trading on an organised market in the EU on an 
organised and systematic basis, called in the directive systematic internalisers. These 
raise significantly the levels of transparency of EU equity markets. This article explores 
the possible impact of MiFID’s rules on trading volume in EU equity markets as a guide 
for EU policy-making in this area taking also into account the findings of finance and 
regulation literature on market microstructure.2 The mere existence of an efficient price 
discovery mechanism is in itself insufficient if investors want to transact at efficient 
prices; in other words: “[e]fficient prices, after all, are unimportant if one can transact 
only a 100-share lot at these prices” (Madhavan et al., 2001). Thus, the actual impact of 
MiFID’s transparency rules on trading volume in EU equity markets will have direct 
influence on the efficient operation of these markets. 
Keynes has suggested that the degree of liquidity of an asset can be measured on the 
basis of: 
a the riskiness of its final value (ability to realise the asset’s value) 
b the availability of the market to readily absorb the sale of the asset without any 
serious downward pressure on the price of the asset. 
The absorptive capacity of the market has been used by certain authors as a measure of 
liquidity (Pagano, 1989) and is to a certain extent dependent on prevailing levels of 
trading volume. Another criterion for measuring liquidity is the depth of the bid/offer 
spread in quote driven markets and the difference between the best buy and sell limit 
orders in order driven markets.3 This article does not purport to measure the liquidity 
impact of MiFID on EU equity markets but rather to examine its possible effect on 
trading volume, which, in turn may have a significant bearing on prevailing levels of 
liquidity. In order to measure trading volume we use three criteria: volume-based 
turnover, value-based turnover and turnover ratio. 
Since MiFID has not yet been implemented in EU member states, we examine the 
shift of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from Stock Exchange Automatic Quotation 
System (SEAQ) to securities electronic trading service (SETS) on 20 October 1997 to 
draw tentative conclusions on MiFID’s predicted impact on trading volume. The 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   98 E. Avgouleas and S. Degiannakis    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
examined period extends from 22 October 1992 to 18 October 2002. The data set 
comprises the price, the volume-based turnover and the number of ordinary shares in 
issue, on a daily basis, for 70 stocks that remained in the FTSE100 index throughout the 
period under investigation. Thirty stocks did not maintain a presence in the basket of 
FTSE100 for the entire post-SETS period. The data was obtained from DataStream©. 
International financial markets witnessed during the examined period three very 
important developments. The first development was the radical transformation of market 
structure through the introduction of ATSs. The second development was the advent of 
internet trading, which allowed retail investors much higher levels of access to stock 
trading. The third development was the stock market bubble of the late 1990s, which 
increased trading volume in a rather non-linear and unexpected manner. If the impact of 
the aforementioned market developments on trading volume is isolated, then there is no 
evidence that the enhanced trade transparency standards, which followed the introduction 
of SETS, increased the market’s absorptive capacity. 
This article is divided in five sections. The first section is the present introduction. 
The second section provides a brief discussion of the mechanics of market transparency 
and its perceived impact on trading volume. The third section explains the new 
transparency obligations that MiFID imposes on: 
a organised securities markets 
b MTF 
c ‘systematic internalisers’. 
The fourth section examines the impact on trading volume of the LSE’s shift from a 
dealer market to an order-driven market. The fifth section brings the different strands of 
the present discussion to a comprehensive conclusion. 
2 Market transparency and market welfare 
2.1 Defining market transparency 
A transparent market is a market that combines three elements: 
a constant flow of issuer specific information 
b disclosure of material interests in financial assets 
c pre- and post-trade dissemination of information about orders and trades. 
The first two elements are regulated by mandatory disclosure rules and their discussion 
falls outside the scope of this article. 
Price transparency means the public availability of information about superior prices 
for the conclusion of certain trades specified as to their quantity. Trade transparency 
means the public availability of information about current trading flows on the market in 
terms of volume. As a market must be transparent before and after the conclusion of the 
transaction, relevant rules regulate the level of both pre-trade and post-trade transparency. 
Pre-trade transparency means the availability of data about the size and price of orders 
flowing to the market, pending execution. Also information about the prices at which a 
market maker is ready to buy and sell securities of a specified size (quote). Post-trade 
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transparency means the availability of information after the conclusion of a transaction, 
especially information about the specific price, quantity and time of the transaction. 
Maximum post-trade transparency would comprise immediate publication of data about 
the price and volume of each transaction, as well as the identification of the transacting 
parties [Steil, (1996), p.66, note 9]. 
Order-driven securities markets usually maintain a high level of invisibility of  
pre-execution orders and price limits imposed on them, until the time of execution. 
Dealer markets have, usually, high levels of pre-trade transparency. Market makers on 
the LSE, for instance, before the introduction of SETS, used to post their quotes on 
SEAQ screens, and this ensured a high level of pre-execution price visibility. On the 
other hand, post-trade transparency is considerably higher in order-driven markets, 
which, in general, publish information about matched trades immediately. In dealer 
markets, delayed publication of information about completed trades is the norm  
[Steil, (1996), pp.32–33]. 
2.2 The welfare effects of market transparency rules 
Because of the complexity of the price discovery mechanism market information is of 
considerable value to those who may wish to trade in the near future. Market participants 
may employ the so-called ‘trade’ and ‘price decoding’ techniques in order to deduce new 
information from the posted quotes or incoming order flow, as well as from completed 
trades [Gilson and Kraakman, (1984), pp.573–575, 577–578]. Depending on the 
reliability of such information and investor’s technical expertise and skill, wide 
availability of information improves the allocative efficiency of investor trading. This is 
achieved because a more equitable distribution of actual and potential trading profit 
opportunities between broker-dealers and market users (outside investors) is ensured by 
restricting [see Mahoney, (1997), pp.1485–1486] the ability of brokers and exchange 
members to front-run client trades. 
Furthermore, trade transparency rules are introduced as a means to ensure: 
a better execution of client orders 
b the reduction in the frequency of market abuse in the form of insider dealing and 
market manipulation, as large trades or their source may, eventually, be detected.4 
Yet, the producers of trade information, namely, those who have just transacted, cannot 
be compensated. Thus, the same public-collective good argument employed to justify 
mandatory disclosure rules [Coffee, 1984; Mahoney, (1995), p.1047] may also be used in 
the present context. Namely, it is assumed that, in the absence of strict publication 
requirements, trade information would remain under-supplied, favouring internalising 
brokers and/or exchange members over outside traders. In the absence, for instance, of 
rules that oblige broker/dealers to publish investor limit orders on receipt, dealers can 
front-run client orders, [Board and Sutcliffe, (1995), p.2] or leave them to expire in order 
to execute them from their books at a more advantageous price. 
However, regulatory initiatives to increase market transparency standards are usually 
opposed on the following grounds: 
a If traders lose their ability to capture most of the value of information they have 
acquired through hard effort they will cease searching for new information. This 
development would harm the information efficiency of market prices. 
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b If traders cannot conceal their positions, until they have extracted the full value of 
private information, increased transparency standards may cause an outflow of trades 
from the market concerned. Large traders, in particular, can become very vulnerable. 
If information about their trades becomes readily available, the market might turn 
against their positions. Large traders might in response abstain from active trading. 
c Changes in a market’s transparency alter a trader’s ability to strategically reveal 
orders. This results in increased transaction costs and reduced liquidity, because 
trades are withdrawn to avoid revealing orders to ‘noise’ and other ‘parasitic’ traders 
(Harris, 1996). 
d A requirement of immediate publication of trade information may penalise market 
makers, which are legally obliged to provide liquidity in the market for the relevant 
financial asset.5 Therefore, trading volume seems to migrate from the very 
transparent markets to those with lower pre- and post-trade transparency. 
e It seems that lower transparency standards reduce transaction spreads, since market 
makers tend to offer better prices on block trades, when these remain concealed for 
some time, because they can exploit the information conveyed by such trades 
(Madhavan, 1993; Pagano and Röell, 1996]. 
Nonetheless, many arguments against high standards of market transparency contain 
loopholes. First, traders that acquire and read accurately new information or reinterpret 
already available information faster than the rest of the market can, for a while, make 
superior returns over that information. Secondly, arguments have been offered against the 
view that high transparency standards inhibit trading volume and liquidity  
(Pagano, 1989). Increased market transparency standards might, for instance, result in 
lower instead of higher trading costs and thus increase liquidity. In a dealer market, the 
dealer is exposed to the danger of being taken advantage by informed traders. As a result, 
he widens his bid/offer spread raising the trading costs of uninformed traders. On the 
other hand, in a relatively transparent market where the dealer is less concerned with the 
possibility that he might incur losses to insiders he lowers his spreads decreasing 
investors’ trading costs. The argument applies equally to order-driven markets. Investor 
monitoring of trading trends becomes easier, and their ability to respond faster to them 
leads, possibly, to increased trading volume.6 Also, as experience from the operation of 
London inter dealer brokers (‘IDBs’)7 demonstrates, the withholding of trade information 
is not used by market dealers only in order to protect their trades, but also in order to 
provide inaccessible trade information to selected clients.8 In addition, it seems that the 
rapid publication of post-trade information improves investor confidence that ‘they obtain 
fair prices’, possibly, attracting additional order flows [Gemmill, (1994), pp.26–27]. 
Moreover, the multiplication of electronic trading channels, as, for instance, the ATSs 
(see Harris, 1993), makes market transparency a matter of cardinal importance for 
reasons of protection of the integrity of the price formation mechanism. In this context, 
another issue that has emerged over the recent years is the transparency of executing 
brokers’ order books, especially in respect of limit orders and above all the transparency 
of transactions executed internally by highly integrated financial institutions. These have 
the ability to execute a client’s order against a proprietary position or match internally 
two opposite client orders without having to send it to an exchange or an ATS for 
execution. It is unlikely that, in the absence of very large trades, which are subject to 
mandatory reporting requirements, the marketplace will receive information about the 
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details of such transactions in a timely manner. The issue of internalisation was one of the 
most controversial topics that MiFID has sought to regulate. It raises concerns about the 
information efficiency of securities markets’ price formation mechanism, because of 
limited availability of price and trade information and trade fragmentation, and issues of 
best execution of investors’ orders [Avgouleas, (2005), pp.336–349]. 
Notwithstanding the above, accepting that market transparency plays a very crucial 
role in ensuring the fair operation of financial markets does not mean that financial 
exchanges and their members should not ascertain property rights over market (trade and 
price) information [Mulherin et al., 1991; Mahoney, (1997), p.1479]. In the highly 
competitive environment that these operate, selling financial information constitutes a 
very legitimate source of income. Exchanges can negotiate with interested investor’s 
information access agreements on a purely commercial basis [see also Mulherin et al., 
(1991), pp.633–637; Mahoney, (1997), pp.1480–1481]. 
Exchanges, ATSs and internalising brokers should, however, have no right to restrict 
access to trade information to any investor who is willing to pay the required price, in 
much the same way that lighthouses could not discriminate against passing ships in  
19th century Britain, which, as Coase proved, was not a public service but was financed 
through levies raised on shippers [Coase, (1974), p.357]. A modified version of this 
approach is, arguably, followed by MiFID, which seems to allow (through the use of the 
term: on ‘reasonable commercial terms’) commercial negotiations between investors and 
other users of market data and operators of both MTFs9 and organised exchanges10 for the 
right to have direct and immediate access to pre- and post-trade information. In this 
sense, market information preserves its ‘public/collective good’ character, while 
members or owners of the facility on which such information is generated are 
compensated for their services [see also Mahoney, (1997), pp.1481–1482]. 
3 MiFID rules on market transparency 
3.1 The transparency obligations of regulated markets 
MiFID imposes on operators of both MTFs11 and regulated markets (exchanges)12 
obligations for the timely publication of pre- and post-trade information. This information 
covers bid and offer prices, the depth of trading interest and order flow, volume, price 
and the time of completed trades, in respect of shares admitted to trading on a regulated 
market. 
The pre-trade transparency obligations of regulated markets involve the continuous 
publication of information about: 
a current bid and offer prices which are advertised through their systems for shares 
admitted to trading (pre-trade transparency)13 
b the specific types of order, the bid/offer spread in order-driven markets. 
The types and size of quotes that designated market-makers in quote-driven markets will 
be required to publish are to be determined by subsequent legislation, the so-called  
Level 2 implementing measures.14 The display of large size orders and quotes or of 
orders and quotes in illiquid securities may be exempted,15 as such display may inhibit 
liquidity. 
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In the case of completed trades, regulated markets have the obligation to publish the 
price, volume and time for all trades in equity instruments ‘concluded under the rules and 
systems of the market on a reasonable commercial basis and as close to real time as 
possible’16 (post-trade transparency). The reporting of the details of large trades and 
trades in illiquid securities could be deferred. The range of orders/quotes to be disclosed 
will also be defined by Level 2 implementing measures. 
3.2 The transparency obligations of MTFs 
Among other obligations imposed by MiFID on investment firms and market operators is 
the objective, fair, timely and efficient handling of trading interests expressed through 
MTFs.17 The authors of the Directive have tried to achieve this objective through, inter 
alia, the imposition of pre- and post-trade transparency obligations in respect of equity 
transactions concluded on MTFs,18 which are largely symmetrical with the transparency 
obligations imposed by MiFID on regulated markets for similar orders or transactions 
displayed on or concluded through such markets. MTF operators have no post-trade 
transparency obligations, namely, the obligation to publish data on concluded trades, 
where relevant information is made public under the system of a regulated market.19 
Possibilities for deferral of trade reporting, and the range/depth of pre-trade disclosure are 
quite similar to those applicable to regulated markets.20 Also, auction-crossing systems 
and other types of MTFs, which do not involve prior disclosure of firm indication for 
prices, may be exempted from the scope of the pre-trade transparency obligation.21 
3.3 The transparency obligations of ‘systematic internalisers’ 
Article 27 of the MiFID, which places pre-trade disclosure obligations on investment 
firms that act as ‘systematic internalisers’22 is one of the most controversial provisions of 
the Directive, and was considered by many in the industry as very intrusive to investment 
firms’ economic freedom. 
Article 27 requires investment firms, which execute client orders in shares internally 
and outside of a regulated market or an MTF on an organised and systematic basis to 
publish firm quotes, namely to disclose to the market the prices at which they would be 
willing to buy from and/or to sell to their clients shares admitted to trading in a regulated 
market.23 The publication obligation is limited to transactions up to ‘standard market 
size’, defined as the ‘average size’ for the orders executed in those shares on EU 
markets.24 This provision ensures that European wholesale markets are not be subject to 
the rule and thus wholesale broker-dealers shall not be exposed to significant risks in 
their role as market makers. 
‘Systematic internalisers’ must make public their quotes regularly and continuously, 
during normal trading hours. As firms are obliged to make public such quotes on a 
reasonable commercial basis, MiFID allows ‘systematic internalisers’ to decide the group 
of clients to whom they shall make such quotes available (retail or professional),25 and 
the number of transactions they may undertake from the same client.26 The same firms 
have post-trade transparency obligations for transactions in shares admitted to trading on 
a regulated market, which they execute internally and outside of a regulated market or an 
MTF. They must make public details of such transactions ‘as close to real time as 
possible’.27 
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Given the importance of the terms ‘standard market size’ and ‘average size’, it is not 
surprising that the debate in the EU as to the content that should be given in these terms 
in the forthcoming EU Directive, which as a Level 2 implementing measure, in 
accordance with the Lamfalussy process, will give meaning to many of MiFID’s opaque 
concepts, is quite heated. Providing definitions that are not expansive enough as to cover 
the majority of medium size trades in equities may be of crucial importance for 
maintaining and increasing trading volume in EU equity markets, in view of ever 
growing global competition for the provision of trade intermediation and execution 
services. For this reason, one of the central themes of this paper is to raise awareness 
about the adverse consequences that the restrictive content of market maker’s obligation 
to timely publish their quotes in regulated markets [Article 44(3)] and the reach of 
systematic internalisers’ order and trade publication requirements may have on EU equity 
markets. 
4 Measuring the impact of transparency rules on trading volume 
4.1 Identifying the appropriate benchmark to measure trading volume 
There is an extensive literature dealing with measures of trading volume. Andersen 
(1996), Campbell et al. (1993), Gallant et al. (1992), Karpoff (1987), Lamoureux and 
Lastrapes (1994), and Lo and Wang (2000) are some of the studies that investigate the 
properties of various measures of volume. Karpoff (1987) and Lo and Wang (2000) have 
reviewed the most important surveys of measures of trading volume. Based mainly on  
Lo and Wang (2000), we use the following three measures of trading volume: 
• the number of shares traded for asset i on a particular day t, called here volume-based 
turnover, yt,i 
• the number of shares that were traded at the current day’s t closing price, called here 
value-based turnover, yt,ipt,i 
• the ratio of the value-based turnover to the market value: (yt,ipt,i) / (Yt,ipt,i), where 
Yt,ipt,i is the market value of asset i on day t and Yt,i represents the ordinary shares in 
issue of company i at current date t. 
Note that the number of shares traded to the total number of shares outstanding, or  
yt,i / Yt,i, gives the same result. Datar et al. (1998) have used turnover ratio (number of 
shares traded as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding) as a proxy for liquidity, 
in order to provide an alternative measure of liquidity to Amihud and Mendelson’s 
(1986) posted bid/offer spread. 
We use a sample that covers the period from October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. 
The data set consists of the price, the volume-based turnover and the number of ordinary 
shares in issue, on a daily basis, for 70 stocks that belong to the FTSE100 index during 
the period that is investigated. The data were obtained from DataStream. Both the  
pre-SETS and post-SETS sample periods consist of 1,262 trading days.28 
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Figure 1 (a) FTSE100 price index, (b) volume-based turnover, (c) value-based turnover and  
(d) the ratio of the value-based turnover to the market value for the period  
October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002 (see online version for colours) 
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Note: *The figure is expressed in thousands. 
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Figure 1 (a) FTSE100 price index, (b) volume-based turnover, (c) value-based turnover and  
(d) the ratio of the value-based turnover to the market value for the period  
October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002 (continued) (see online version for colours) 
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(d) 
Note: *The figure is expressed in thousands. 
Figure 1 depicts the price index, volume-based turnover, value-based turnover and the 
turnover ratio for the FTSE100 index from October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. From a 
visual inspection, all three measures of trading volume are clearly higher in the  
post-SETS period. However, there are two main drawbacks in using the volume-based 
turnover and value-based turnover criteria. The number of shares outstanding has an 
increasing trend, which drives, by default, volume-based turnover to higher levels. 
Moreover, the price levels in the post-SETS period, due to the stock market bubble, are 
higher than in the pre-SETS period driving, by default, to higher levels the value-based 
turnover. So, it may be proper to devise a measure of trading volume that links, in a 
standard form, trading turnover with the total value of the market. Hence, the turnover 
ratio could be identified as the measure of trading volume that remains resistant to market 
changes, namely, changes in the price of relevant stocks and changes in the number of 
outstanding shares. 
4.2 The example of SETS 
As mentioned above, MiFID’s rules on market transparency have not yet been 
implemented. However, we can still draw assumptions as to the possible impact of their 
implementation on trading volume by examining the impact of analogous measures 
imposed in the past, which changed the way securities markets published order and trade 
information. The closest example that can be found is the introduction of increased trade 
transparency standards in the LSE as a result of its transition from a dealer (quote-driven 
market) to an order driven market on 20 October 1997, when trading of FTSE100 stocks 
moved from SEAQ to SETS. Since SETS operated as a central order book, the change 
ensured higher levels of both pre-trade and more crucially post-trade transparency. 
However, unlike most central order books, on SETS, pre-trade transparency is also high 
because the limit orders submitted to the book are visible to all market participants. Thus, 
SETS displays the full current depth of the order book. SETS has also increased the level 
of post-trade transparency FTSE100 stocks with the exception of trades exceeding eight 
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times normal market size (NMS), where the trade need not be published until after the 
dealer has unwound 80% of the original position [Ganley et al., (1998), p.3, Table 2]. 
This was a major reform, as such trades remained undisclosed for between 30 minutes 
and several hours under the SEAQ regime. 
We shall attempt to illustrate below, in a quantitative manner, that if market 
developments that are not related to the transition from a dealer to an order driven market 
on 20 October 1997 are properly accounted for, then there was not, in fact, a statistically 
significant increase in trading volume levels for FTSE100 stocks that is directly related to 
changes in the standards of market transparency. 
We assume that the variables observed in markets (i.e., equity prices, trading volume) 
are priced in continuous time, but the relevant data is sampled discretely in time with a 
constant sample frequency. Hence, we define y(m)t,i, for t = 1 / m, 2 / m,…, as a discrete 
time positive-valued process at day t, for asset i, with m observations per day. 
Accordingly, trading volume may be expressed by measuring levels of trading activity, 
which are directly observed in discrete points in time. Moreover, we assume a sample 
frequency of a daily base, or m = 1, and we rewrite y(1)t,i ≡ yt,i, for reasons of simplicity. 
Hence, { }, 1Tt i ty =  refers to the discretely observed series of trading volume of asset i at 
days t = 1,2,…,T. For the purposes of this paper, we use a sample of data such that the 
day n, at which the SEAQ was replaced by SETS, is equal to (T / 2) + 1 and we identify 
two sub-groups: 
a 1,…,T / 2 
b T / 2 + 1,…,T. Thus, there are 1,2,…,T / 2 days prior to 20th of October 1997 and  
T / 2 + 1,T / 2 + 2,…,T days after the introduction of SETS29. 
4.3 Non-parametric hypothesis testing 
Having already defined the period that will be examined and the stocks that comprise the 
tested sample we turn now to offer a method to investigate whether the level of trading 
activity differs prior to and after the enactment of the specific rule at day n. Figure 2 
presents the frequency distribution histogram of the three measures used here to calculate 
trading volume on FTSE100 stocks during the examined period. 
In order to test the null hypothesis that the first subgroup median is greater than or 
equal to the second subgroup median against the alternative hypothesis that the first 
subgroup has a lower median than the second sub-group, we have to apply a  
non-parametric test, which does not require the assumption that the differences between 
the two samples are normally distributed and the variances are equal: 
{ }( ) { }( )/20 , ,1 /2 1: ,T Tt i t it t TH med y med y= = +≥  
{ }( ) { }( )/21 , ,1 /2 1: .T Tt i t it t TH med y med y= = +<  
The Mann-Whitney test30 is one of the most powerful of the non-parametric tests and it is 
considerably more powerful than the usual parametric tests when applied to non-normally 
distributed data sets. A rejection of the null hypothesis leads to the conclusion that the 
liquidity levels of SEAQ were lower than those of SETS.31 Of course, we expect a less 
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frequent rejection of the null hypothesis when the turnover ratio is used as the trading 
volume measure. According to the results presented in Table 1, in the case of the 
FTSE100 index, the null hypothesis is rejected at any level of significance, indicating that 
the median of trading volume is greater in the post-SETS period, irrespectively, of which 
measure of trading activity is used. 
Figure 2 Histogram of the frequency distribution for the FTSE100 (a) volume-based turnover,  
(b) value-based turnover and (c) the ratio of the value-based turnover to the market 
value for the period October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002 
  
(a)     (b) 
 
(c) 
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Table 1 The median values of pre-SETS and post-SETS samples, the Mann-Whitney statistics 
and the relative p-values for the case of the FTSE100 index 
Measure of trading 
volume 
Mann Whitney 
statistics 
Pre-SETS period 
median value 
Post-SETS period 
median value p-value 
Volume-based 
turnover 
–38.594 291501.0 850954.5 0.00 
Value-based turnover –41.183 1233874 4358136 0.00 
Ratio of turnover to 
market value 
–29.824 2.21% 3.38% 0.00 
Notes: The null hypothesis that the pre-SETS median is greater than or equal to the  
post-SETS median against the alternative that the post-SETS period has a greater 
median. The null hypothesis is rejected for any level of significance. 
In the sequel, the hypothesis is tested separately for each of the 70 stocks and the three 
measures of trading volume. Tables that present the median values of trading volume 
measures in the pre-SETS and post-SETS samples, the Mann-Whitney statistics and the 
relative p-values for each of the three measures are available upon request by the authors. 
In the case of the volume-based turnover, from the total of the 70 stocks, only in five 
cases the null hypothesis is not rejected. As regards the BG Group, British American 
Tobacco, Foreign and Colonial and Hanson stocks their pre-SETS medians of trading 
volume are statistically greater than their post-SETS medians, while in the case of the 
Rexam stock the median of turnover volume in the pre-SETS period is not statistically 
lower than the median in the post-SETS period. 
As regards value-based turnover, in 67 of the 70 cases the post-SETS median of 
trading volume is greater than the pre-SETS median. For any level of significance, the 
null hypothesis is rejected for all the cases but for the Hanson, Rexam and Tomkins 
stocks. However, that measure of trading volume suffers from subjectivity as it is highly 
related to the current conditions of the market. For example, in the case of a ‘bull’ 
market, where a sudden increase of stock prices is often observed, the increase in  
value-based turnover is an immediate consequence. Note that the period of 1998 and 
1999 is a period of abrupt increase of market prices. 
When the ratio of the value-based turnover to the market value is used to measure 
trading volume, the null hypothesis is not rejected at 1% level of significance, for 20 of 
the 70 stocks. However, even this measure of trading activity, which is proved robust to 
market changes, is statistically greater after Monday, October 20, 1997, in the 71% of the 
cases, at any reasonable level of significance. 
4.4 Isolating the effect of SETS on trading volume from exogenous to market 
transparency events 
Undoubtedly, overall trading volume is greater in the post-SETS sample. But, is the 
observed increase on the level of trading volume attributable to the replacement of the 
LSE’s trading system, or was it affected by exogenous to this replacement events? To 
answer this question we should take into consideration the effect of events that are 
independent to the discussed change. For example, during the surveyed period, financial 
markets experienced the impact of technological revolution which radically transformed 
trading infrastructure, especially trade execution mechanisms, the speed of dissemination 
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and amplification of market information, and investors’ and traders’ access, e.g., trading 
on the internet by retail investor. The latter led to a very significant increase in the 
number of investors who actively traded on developed securities markets in the post-1997 
period. In addition, from 1997 to 1999 securities markets in most of the Western world 
experienced one of the strongest bull markets in their history, which resulted in the 
creation of multiple ‘stock market bubbles’. This bull market was followed by a bear 
market, which lasted until the end of the period covered by the sample. Thus, in order to 
take into consideration events exogenous to the introduction of SETS, we introduce two 
alternative analysis approaches. 
4.5 A deterministic isolation of long-term trading volume 
4.5.1 The first approach 
In the first approach, we use alternative criteria to measure trading volume by subtracting 
the long-term trading volume that is present on both sub-samples. Using a regression 
model we remove the upward trend, which is present on the whole sample. Thereinafter, 
we test whether the remaining trading volume differs prior to and after the introduction of 
SETS. Let us consider that trading volume is expressed by a non-linear function of time, 
f(t), and the unpredictable component, εt,i. As the trading volume, as presented in  
Figure 1, has an upward trend of quadratic form, we assume that f(t) = a0 + a1t + a2t2. 
Note that f(t) is a common factor for both the pre-sample and post-sample periods, so it 
does not discriminate against either the pre-SETS or the post-SETS period. Based on the 
three measures of trading activity, mentioned in the previous section, we define the  
de-trended trading volume measures ε1,t,i, ε2,t,i and ε3,t,i, in the following forms: 
• de-trended volume-based turnover 
( )1, , ,t i t iy f tε = −  (1) 
• de-trended value-based turnover 
( )2, , , ,t i t i t iy p f tε = −  (2) 
• de-trended turnover ratio 
( ) ( ) ( )3, , , , , , .t i t i t i t i t iy p Y p f tε = −  (3) 
The parameters a0, a1 and a2 in f(t) are estimated by the method of least squares, under 
the assumption that the component εt,i is normally distributed. Hence, for the case of the 
de-trended volume-based turnover, the estimated regression model is presented as: 
2
, 0 1 2 1, , ,t i t iy a a t a t ε= + + +  
( )21, , 1,~ 0, .t i iNε σ  (4) 
The estimated process { }1, , 1ˆ Tt i tε =  is the de-trended volume-based turnover, for 
2
1, , , 0 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,= − − −t i t iy a a t a tε  where 0aˆ , 1ˆa  and 2aˆ  are the estimated values of the 
parameters in regression model (4). In the sequel, we reexamine the hypothesis that the 
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level of trading volume changes following the introduction of SETS on 20th October 
1997: 
{ }( ) { }( )/20 1, , 1, ,1 /2 1ˆ ˆ: ,T Tt i t it t TH med medε ε= = +≤  
{ }( ) { }( )/21 1, , 1, ,1 /2 1ˆ ˆ: .T Tt i t it t TH med medε ε= = +>  (5) 
The regression model (4) is also applied for deriving the de-trended trading volume 
measures defined in (2) and (3) and the hypothesis test in framework (5) is used for the 
de-trended value-based turnover and the de-trended turnover ratio. 
Table 2 Estimated parameters of model (4) for the FTSE100 daily returns 
 De-trended  volume-based turnover  
De-trended  
value-based turnover  
De-trended  
turnover ratio 
 Coefficient t-Statistic*  Coefficient t-Statistic*  Coefficient t-Statistic* 
0aˆ  373052.7 27.052  758195.6 12.625  2.380 47.472 
1ˆa  –471.631 –19.299  375.3 3.525  –0.000877 –9.871 
2aˆ  0.379 41.786  0.707 17.890  7.43E–07 22.515 
Note: *HAC standard errors are computed. 
Figure 3 FTSE100 (a) de-trended volume-based turnover { }1, , 100ˆ t FTSEε , (b) value-based turnover 
{ }2, , 100ˆ t FTSEε and (c) turnover ratio { }3, , 100ˆ t FTSEε for the period October 22, 1992 to 
October 18, 2002 
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Figure 3 FTSE100 (a) de-trended volume-based turnover { }1, , 100ˆ t FTSEε , (b) value-based turnover 
{ }2, , 100ˆ t FTSEε and (c) turnover ratio { }3, , 100ˆ t FTSEε for the period October 22, 1992 to 
October 18, 2002 (continued) 
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(c) 
The application of the model illustrated in framework (4) on FTSE100 daily returns 
yields the estimated parameters that are presented in Table 2. The Newey and West 
(1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are 
computed, as they are consistent estimators in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form. All the estimated parameters are statistically different 
to zero for any reasonable level of significance indicating the appropriateness of the 
quadratic form of f(t).32 Figure 3 depicts the plots of the de-trended measures of trading 
volume, and Figure 4 presents the relative frequency distribution histograms. The 
asymmetrical form of the histogram of frequency distribution and the high level of 
kurtosis show that the de-trended measures are still non-normally distributed. Thus, the 
use of a non-parametric test that is robust to the shortage of the normality assumption is 
as apposite here as in the previous section. 
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Figure 4 Histogram of the frequency distribution for the FTSE100 (a) de-trended volume-based 
turnover { }1, , 100ˆ t FTSEε , (b) value-based turnover { }2, , 100ˆ t FTSEε  and (c) the turnover 
ratio { }3, , 100ˆ t FTSEε  for the period October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002 
  
(a)     (b) 
 
(c) 
We apply the hypothesis test in (5) for the { }1, , 100ˆ t FTSEε , { }2, , 100ˆ t FTSEε  and { }3, , 100ˆ t FTSEε  
estimated processes. According to Table 3, for two of the three de-trended measures of 
trading volume the null hypothesis is strongly rejected, giving support to the assumption 
that the observed increase of trading volume is not attributable to the introduction of 
SETS. As regards the first of the de-trended measures the 12.356 value of the  
Mann-Whitney statistic leaves no room to dispute the lower level of the measure in the 
post-SETS period. In the case of the de-trended turnover ratio, the median values of  
pre-SETS and post-SETS samples are –0.00679 and –0.13079, respectively and the 
Mann-Whitney statistic is 4.756, with a zero p-value. On the other hand, the de-trended 
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value-based turnover tells us that the introduction of SETS did not influence the levels of 
trading volume. Summing up the case for the FTSE100 index, the removal of the upward 
trend that is common to both sub-samples permits the use de-trended criteria in the given 
measures of trading volume, which lead us to the conclusion that trading volume has not, 
in fact, increased due to the introduction of SETS. This conclusion is, of course, subject 
to upholding as valid to our assumption that the influence of exogenous events – events 
not related to the change of trading system and standards of transparency – on trading 
volume can be measured and isolated. 
Table 3 The median values of pre-SETS and post-SETS samples, the Mann-Whitney statistics 
and the relative p-values for the case of the FTSE100 index 
Measure of trading volume 
Mann 
Whitney 
statistics 
Pre-SETS 
period median 
value 
Post-SETS 
period median 
value 
p-value 
De-trended volume-based 
turnover 
12.356 18212.5 –63884.6 0.00 
De-trended value-based 
turnover 
–0.474 –72668.4 –80095.9 0.68 
De-trended ratio of turnover 
to market value 
4.756 –0.00679 –0.13079 0.00 
Notes: The null hypothesis that the pre-SETS median of the de-trended measure of 
trading volume is lower than or equal to the post-SETS median value against the 
alternative that the pre-SETS period has a greater median. The null hypothesis is 
rejected for any level of significance greater than the relative p-value. 
For the 70 stocks that comprise our dataset, let us proceed in testing the difference of 
median values of the de-trended measures of trading volume before and after the 
introduction of SETS. In respect of the de-trended volume-based turnover and the  
de-trended value-based turnover we reach to the same conclusion. The null hypothesis is 
rejected for 61 and 67 stocks in the cases of the de-trended volume-based turnover and 
the de-trended value-based turnover, respectively, in 5% level of significance. However, 
in the case of the de-trended turnover ratio, the hypothesis tests do not give us a clear 
view. For 39 of the 70 cases the null hypothesis is rejected in 5% level of significance. 
We can also express the dynamic formulation of trading volume by adding a dummy 
variable in the model illustrated in framework (4) to express the change of the trading 
volume level after the day that SETS was introduced: 
( )
2
0 1 2 3
2~ 0,
0, 1 2
1, .
t t t
t
t
y a a t a t a d
N
if t Td
else
ε
ε σ
= + + + +
⎧ ≤ ≤= ⎨⎩
 (6) 
Framework (6) captures both the long-term upward quadratic trend, f(t) = a1t + a2t2, and 
the different level of trading volume due to the introduction of SETS, a0 + a3dt. Model (6) 
is applied to all three measures of trading volume. The estimated values of the 
parameters, which are presented in Table 4, are in accordance with our findings. 
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Table 4 Estimated parameters of model (6) for the FTSE100 volume-based turnover,  
value-based turnover and the turnover ratio for the period October 22, 1992 to  
October 18, 2002 
 Volume–based turnover  Value–based turnover  Turnover ratio 
 Coefficient t–Statistic*  Coefficient t-Statistic*  Coefficient t-Statistic* 
0aˆ  330940.9 25.26774  895480.9 18.98305  2.307945 40.49612 
1aˆ  –387.2006 –11.17568  59.67590 0.446110  –0.000745 –5.451773 
2aˆ  0.404818 20.74322  0.756502 9.316662  7.96E–07 11.81935 
3aˆ  –168885.1 –6.619655  543140.6 3.989645  –0.280274 –2.730011 
Note: *HAC standard errors are computed. 
Figure 5 Regression line of model (6) for the FTSE100 (a) volume-based turnover,  
(b) value-based turnover and (c) the turnover ratio for the period October 22, 1992 to 
October 18, 2002 (see online version for colours) 
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The estimated values of parameter a3 are negative and statistically different to zero in two 
of the three cases, indicating that at the time of the introduction of SETS trading volume 
did not shift to a higher level. As regards the case of the measure of value-based turnover, 
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the positive and statistically significant value of parameter a3 may be associated with the 
sudden increase of stock prices rather than with an increase of trading volume. At this 
point we should be reminded of the main disadvantage of the turnover by value criterion: 
it is based on current levels of stock prices. Thus, it reflects the rapid increase in prices 
that securities markets experienced during the first three years of the post-SETS period 
due to the ‘stock market bubble’ and the increased demand induced by easy retail 
investor access. Figure 5 plots the regression lines from the application of model (6) for 
the de-trended measures, giving a visual perspective of our arguments. So, we conclude 
that 
a although trading activity exhibits an upward trend during the full data set that is 
examined 
b the introduction of SETS by itself did not increase the level of trading volume. 
4.5.2 Simulated evidence 
In order to investigate whether the assumption that a change in the level of trading 
volume could be efficiently captured by the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test, we run a 
Monte Carlo simulation. We create 10,000 series (each series is consisted of 10,000 data) 
from the data generating processes: 
( )
2
0 1 2
~ 0,1
t t
iid
t
y a a t a t
N
ε
ε
= + + +
 (7) 
and 
( )
2
0 1 2 3
1 20,
1, 2 1
~ 0,1 .
t t t
t
iid
t
y a a t a t a d
if t T
d
if T t T
N
ε
ε
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + + +
≤ ≤⎧= ⎨ + ≤ ≤⎩
′
 (8) 
The parameters are set equal to the values estimated for the FTSE100 turnover ratio,  
(a0, a1, a2) = (2.38, –0.000877, 7.43E–07) and ( )0 1 2 3, , ,a a a a′ ′ ′ ′ =  (2.308, –0.000745,  
7.97E–07, –0.28027). The data generating process in (7) produces samples with a 
quadratic upward trend, while the data generating process in (8) creates data samples with 
a long-term upward trend and a downward shift in the level of ty′  at time t = T / 2. For 
each simulated series of both data generating process, the innovation series, tˆε , of the 
regression model 20 1 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ,t ty a a t a t ε= + + +  is estimated. If the data generating process is 
(7) then the null hypothesis { }( ) { }( )/20 , ,1 /2 1ˆ ˆ: ,T Tt i t it t TH med medε ε= = +≤  against the 
alternative { }( ) { }( )/21 , ,1 /2 1ˆ ˆ: T Tt i t it t TH med medε ε= = +>  should not be rejected for the 
( )1 %a−  of the cases at %a  level of significance. Accordingly, if the data generating 
process is (8) then the null hypothesis should be rejected for the ( )1 %a−  of the cases at 
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%a  level of significance. The Mann-Whitney statistic is used for conducting the 
hypothesis test. 
Figure 6 Frequency distribution histogram of the Mann-Whitney statistic values of the 
simulated series and the tabulation of the percentage counts and cumulative counts of 
the relative probability values 
 
Figure 6 presents the results of the simulation study. If the generating process (7) derives 
the data, indeed for the ( )1 %a−  of the cases the null hypothesis is not rejected at %a  
level of significance. On the other hand, for the generated process (8), the total of the 
cases lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis. Hence, according to the simulated study, 
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the procedure followed in the previous section in order to explore the relationship 
between higher standards of trade transparency, introduced as a result of the operation of 
SETS, with the observed increase in trading volume, leads to robust results for the  
Mann-Whitney hypothesis test. Furthermore, the simulation study was repeated for 
various sets of parameter values and we find out that the results were indifferent to the 
values of the applied parameters. 
4.6 A stochastic isolation of long-term trading volume 
In the previous section, we attempted to answer the question whether the introduction of 
SETS had an impact on trading volume levels in the sampled FTSE100 stocks. We used 
de-trended measures of liquidity, fitted estimating a quadratic time trend, and concluded 
that market developments other than the introduction of SETS were the most important 
reasons underlying the observed increase in trading volume. However, the factors that are 
not related to the market transparency were considered deterministically. The estimation 
of a deterministic time trend may not be robust for the choice of time period. In this case, 
had we analysed a dataset relating to a different time period, we would have assumed 
another trend for long-term trading volume. Namely, an extension of the examined 
dataset to a more recent time period, when trading volume did not continue to rise 
according to a quadratic time trend, would obviously change the form of the long-term 
trend. 
The method of stochastic time trends as developed by Harvey (1989) provides a 
statistical background to model the unobserved components along with the dummy 
variable expressing the change in the levels of market transparency. In this section, we 
propose a structural time series analysis that is based on the Kalman (1960, 1963) 
filtering method in a state space form to estimate simultaneously the stochastic movement 
of the long-term trading volume and the effect of the change in transparency standards. 
Structural time series models provide a framework where the variable under 
investigation, ,t iy , is modelled as the sum of unobserved, but with a direct interpretation, 
components such as trend, ,t iμ , and irregulars, ,t iε : 
( )
( )
( )
2
, , , , ,
2
, 1, 1, , , ,
2
, 1, , , ,
,    ~ 0,
,    ~ 0,
,    ~ 0,
0, 1 2
1, .
iid
t i t i t t i t i i
iid
t i t i t i t i t i i
iid
t i t i t i t i i
t
y ad N
N
N
if t Td
else
ε
η
ξ
μ ε ε σ
μ μ β η η σ
β β ξ ξ σ
− −
−
= + +
= + +
= +
⎧ ≤ ≤= ⎨⎩
 (9) 
In order to focus on the impact of SETS on trading volume, a deterministic dummy, td , 
is introduced and we investigate if it is statistically significant. The stochastic property of 
irregulars, level of trend and slope of trend are driven by 2,iεσ , 2,iησ  and 2,iξσ , 
respectively. If any of these variances is zero, the stochastic component reduces to a 
deterministic stationary process. 
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Figure 7 Trend line and irregulars of model (9) for the FTSE100 (a) volume-based turnover,  
(b) value-based turnover and (c) turnover ratio for the period October 22, 1992 to 
October 18, 2002 (see online version for colours) 
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Table 5 Estimated values of model (9) for the FTSE100 volume-based turnover, value-based 
turnover and turnover ratio for the period October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002 
 2, 100FTSEεσ  2, 100FTSEησ  Coefficient a Standard error t-Statistic p-value 
Volume-based 
turnover 
167000 56120 –36048 138000 –0.26143 0.7938 
Value-based 
turnover 
674000 238000 –170000 571000 –0.29777 0.7659 
Turnover ratio 0.62255 0.22039 –0.10114 0.52850 –0.19137 0.8483 
The structural time series model in (9) is estimated for the three measures of trading 
volume. In all the cases, the estimated variance of the slope is close to zero, indicating 
that the slope of trend is deterministic. The application of the structural model illustrated 
in (9) on FTSE100 daily returns yields the estimated parameters that are presented in 
Table 5. Figure 7 depicts the trend, , 100t FTSEμ , and irregular, , 100t FTSEε , components. The 
estimated values of parameter a are not statistically different to zero in all the cases, 
indicating that, at the time of the introduction of SETS, trading volume did not shift to a 
higher level. 
The model framework in (9) is applied for the three measures of trading volume in 
the 70 stocks of the sample. In the majority of the cases the null hypothesis that a = 0 is 
not rejected. Specifically, for 10% level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
four, seven and six cases as regards the measures of volume-based turnover, value-based 
turnover and turnover ratio, respectively33. Therefore, in general terms the use of the 
stochastic method leads to a similar conclusion with that offered in the previous section: 
the introduction of SETS was not a significant contributing factor to the observed 
increase in trading volume for the stocks under consideration. 
5 Conclusions 
On the basis of the three benchmarks used in this article to measure trading volume, we 
observe a clear increase in the level of trading activity of the sampled FTSE100 stocks in 
the post-SETS period. However, this result may be unrelated to any influence that 
increased transparency standards had on trading volume following the change of trading 
system and the introduction of a central order book for FTSE100 stocks. Thus, a 
procedure had to be devised to measure the influence of the introduction of SETS on 
trading volume during the examined period in isolation from that of other factors – 
factors that do not relate to this change. For this reason, we used two different methods 
that permitted us to isolate the trend in trading volume, which is common in both the  
pre-SETS and the post-SETS periods. In using the first method, we removed the 
deterministic trading volume trend that is shared by both periods. We named the modified 
measures: de-trended measures of trading volume. The use of the de-trended measures 
led us to the conclusion that the introduction of SETS did not have an appreciable impact 
on trading volume for the sampled FTSE100 stocks. In using the second method, we 
utilised a stochastic structural time series analysis technique, which allowed us to reach a 
similar conclusion: the introduction of SETS did not lead to any appreciable increase in 
trading volume for the stocks under study. 
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The above findings, based on properly adjusted data derived from the operation of 
SETS, indicate that the higher transparency standards, which MiFID imposes on equity 
securities trading in the EU, are an unlikely means of trading volume enhancement. The 
first possibility is that MiFID rules will fail to boost trading volume, an outcome that 
would be consistent with the findings of our study. Another possibility is that this will be 
followed by lower levels of liquidity in EU equity markets – a field in which further 
research is required. A combination of the aforementioned outcomes would harm the 
depth and efficiency of EU equity markets. Therefore, EU law-makers must consider 
seriously the issues of trading volume and liquidity in drafting MiFID’s Level 2 
implementing measures, especially when it comes to the proper reach of the Directive’s 
rules on the publication of small and medium size trades. 
Since this article has only examined the impact of increased transparency rules on 
trading volume, further research is required to assess the likely and, once the Directive is 
implemented, actual impact of MiFID’s transparency rules on the liquidity of EU equity 
markets using as benchmark, inter alia, the depth of the bid-offer spread. 
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Notes 
1 Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, OJ L 145/1. 
2 For an overview see Mahoney (2003), O’Hara (1999), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kini 
and Mian (1995). 
3 Pagano (1996). For details about the benchmarks used to measure liquidity based on the 
bid/offer spread see Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Cheung et al. (2003), Chordia et al. 
(2003), Fleming (2001) and Irvine et al. (2000). 
4 For the importance of market transparency in safeguarding the integrity of securities markets 
see Avgouleas (1998). 
5 Market makers usually absorb large positions in their capacity as liquidity providers and 
subsequently re-balance their inventories in the open market Board and Sutcliffe (1995,  
pp.7–19). 
6 e.g., the display of limit orders may encourage new limit orders to be submitted. 
7 On the LSE market makers’ trades executed through IDBs were not appearing on the main 
SEAQ screens and thus were visible only to dealers allowed to trade on that system. The 
restriction of access to IDBs’ systems for non LSE members was abolished by the LSE Notice 
of Rule Amendments N74/97, 16 October 1997. 
8 This custom allowed large traders with close links with securities dealers to trade at better 
prices than the average investor. Steil (1996, p.37) and O’Hara (1995, p.164). 
9 MiFID, Arts 29 and 30. 
10 Arts 44 and 45. 
11 MiFID, Arts 29 and 30. 
12 Arts 44 and 45. 
13 MiFID, Art. 44(1). 
14 On the structure and workings of the so-called Lamfalussy process, the method used for the 
production of financial services legislation in the EU, see Avgouleas (2005, pp.328–333). 
15 MiFID, Art. 44(2). 
16 Art. 45(1). 
17 Art. 14(1). 
18 Arts 29 and 30. 
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19 Art. 30(1). 
20 Arts 29(2) and 30(2). Art. 30(2) requires MTFs to obtain the competent authority’s prior 
approval in respect of arrangements governing deferred trade publication. 
21 Art. 29 (2) and (3)(c). 
22 Art. 4(7) of MiFID defines as ‘systematic internalisers’ investment firms, which, on an 
organised, regular, and systematic basis, deal on own account by buying and selling financial 
instruments against their proprietary capital. 
23 Art. 27(1). 
24 Ibid. 
25 MiFID Art. 27(3). 
26 Art. 27(4). 
27 Art. 28(1). 
28 For two of the 70 stocks in the sample we examine trading volume over 1,153 trading days in 
the pre-SETS period, because they were admitted to the FTSE100 index on March 29, 1993. 
29 Of course, samples of unequal sizes can also be used, as long as there are no major differences 
in the sample sizes. 
30 For more details about the Mann-Whitney test see Sheskin (2003). 
31 Various rank-based nonparametric tests of the hypothesis, namely, that the subgroups have the 
same median, against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different median, without 
the need to assume that distributions have to be normal and the variances have to be equal, 
may be found in Conover (1980). 
32 However, when the assumption of uncorrelated, homoskedastic and normally distributed 
innovations is violated, the statistical inference concerning the estimated values of the 
parameters should be conducted very carefully. 
33 Analytical tables for the 70 stocks are on file with the authors and available upon request. 
